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1. INTRODUCTION .
In the empirical labor economics literature, alabor market is said to exliibit hysteresis if temporary
shocks appear to have persistent effects on earnings and employment histories.^ Akey concern of
empirical labor economists has been the identification of possible propagation mechanisiiis through
which hysteresis might occur.
To date, attention has largely been focused on apparent hysteresis in aggregate unemployment:
namely, the protracted effects that unemployment shocks appear to have on the "natural" rate of
I -• I .
unemployment. Blanchard and Summers (1990) discuss three distinct types of propagation mech-
"* • f ' . i' ' ' ' . ' ' * y/
anisms that have been advanced as possible explanations: lag effects arising from the difficulty
'' ' '' .' 'I''' I ' .' I '
of adjusting physical capital stocks; long-term labor supply effects arising from the huma,n capi-
tal erosion resulting from unemployment; and insider-outsider effects.arising from the preferential
treatment of actual employees relative to potential employees in the wage bargaining process. Al
though Blanchard and Summers identify insider-outsider effects as the most promising explanation
for hvsteresis in European labor markets, they also caution (pp. 270-271) about small sample
problems that make this hypothesis difficult to test.
In contrast, this study focuses on a form ofhysteresis routinely observed for individual work
suppliers and employers in micro panel data: namely, observationally equivalent work suppliers
and employers have markedly different earnings and employment histories [see, e.g., Abowd et
al. (1999)]. The basic question addressed in this study is whether temporary shocks in the form
of idiosyncratic worksite interactions can propagate up into sustained differences in earnings and
employment histories for observationally-equivalent .workers and employers.'' •
. ^As pointed out by^Piscatelli et al. (1999), the,term hysteresis,h^jbeen used in economic and econometric theory
10 refer to two distinct phenomena: persistence in deviations from equilibria, possibly followed by an eventual return"
to a previous equilibriutn ^state; and the^presence of unit/zero roots in systems of linear difference or differential
equations, implying that a single temporary shock permanently changes the equilibrium path of the system. In
empirical economics, however, hysteresis is used more loosely to mean that temporary shocks are observed to result
in a persistent changefrom.a previously persistent systemstate, even though this previously persistent systemstate
cannot be verified to be an equilibrium and the persistent change cannot be verified to be permanent. The latter
usage is followed in the current computational study.
Two interdependent aspects of worksite interactions are considered. Who works for whom,
^d with what regularity? And how do work suppliers and employers hehave in these worksite
interactions?
In real world labor markets, the behavioral characteristics expressed by work suppliers and
employers in their worksite interactions, such as trustworthiness and diligence, depend on who is
working for whom. In turn, who is working for whom depends on the behavioral characteristics thai
have been expressed by work suppliers and employers in their past worksite interactions. Moreover,
as stressed in the efficiency-wage literature [Akerloff and YeUon (1986). Yellon (1991)]. the behav
ioral characteristics of work suppliers and employers can alsobe important determinants of worksite
productivity. These behavioral characteristics thus have potentially strong effects on earnings and
employment histories. Unfortunately, individual data on the behavioral characteristics ofworkers
and employers are difficult to obtain. The potential effects of these behavioral characteristics are
thus usually ignored in micro panel data studies of labor market earnings and employment: typi
cally only observable structural attributes such as training, education, and gender are included as
possible explanatory variables.
Using recently developed agent-based programming tools, however, computational labormarket
frameworks can be constructed in which work suppliers and employers adaptively choose and refuse
their potential worksite partners and evolve their worksite behaviors over time on the basis ofpast
worksite interactions. Consequently, the following hypothesis can now be subjected to systematic
experimental investigation:
Worksite Interaction Hysteresis (WIH) Hypothesis: Temporary shocks in the form ofid
iosyncratic worksite interactions can result in persistently heterogeneous earnings ^d employment
histories for work suppliers and employers with identical observable structure attributes.
This study investigates the WIH hypothesis in the context ofa dynamic computational labor
market framework witli strategically interacting work suppliers and employers.^, As .will be daxified
below, the labor market framework is-a flexible computational laboratory permitting experiments
with a wide variety of alternative specifications for the exogenous aspects of market structure
and agent attributes. The primary purpose of this study, however, :is. to take, a first cut at the
computational'stidy of the WIH'hypothesis by specifying,these exogenous aspects in relatively
simple terms. Thus, as'iihplemented for-this study,'the labor market,,framework comprises.a fixed
equal number of'work suppliers and employers. 'These work suppliers and employers repeatedly
participate in 'costly searches for worksite partners on the basis of continually updated expected
utility, engage in efficiency-wage worksite interactions modelled as prisoner's dilemma games, and
evolve their worksite strategies over time on the basis of the earnings secured by these strategies, in
past worksite interactions.
- •" I--' I•-•'•I . "
Work suppliers have identical observable structural attributes, and similarly for employers. In
particular, each work supplier is assumed to have the same capacity wq, where wq is the maximum
number of potential work offers that each work supplier can make. Similarly, each employer is
assumed to have the same capacity'e?; where eq is the.maximum number of job openings that
each employer can provide.'Work-suppliers and employers are heterogeneous with regard to their
worksite strategies. However, a work supplier and employer, engaged in'a worksite interaction are
not able to directly observe each other's strategies; they only observe the behavior and earnings
I• ' - I >. ; I. '
outcomes flowing from the use of these strategies.
The experimental design of the study consists of the systematic variation, from high to low, of
job capacity asgiven by the ratio eqjwq. Jobs areinexcess supply when job capacity exceeds one, in
balanced supply when job capacity is equal to one, and in tight supply when job capacity is less than
one. For each tested job capacity ratio, twenty different runs are generated using twenty different
^This la.bor market framework was first presented in preliminary fashion in Tesfatsion (1998) as a special case of
the Trade'Network Game (TNG) model developed in Tesfatsion (1997a,b) for studying the evolution of buyer-seller
trade networks. The framework is'an example of agent-based computational economics (ACE) modelling., ACE is the
computational study of economies modelled as evolving decentralized systems.of autonomous interacting agents. For
various ACE-related resources, including surveys, readings, software, and pointers to r^earch groups, see the ACE
web site at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm.
pseudo-random number seed values.^ In examining the resulting run histories, particular attention
is focused"on the experimental determination of correlations between job capacity and the formation
of persistent networks among work suppliers and employers, and between network formations and
the types of persistent worksite behaviors and earnings outcomes that these networks support.
Akey finding of this study is that the WIH hypothesis is strongly supported. In the presence of
job capacity asymmetries, idiosyncratic worksite interactions tend to result in persistent network
patterns and/or persistent behavioral patterns that support persistently heterogeneous earnings
levels across employed work suppliers and across nonvacant employers. These persistent network
and behavioral patterns are intermediate hysteresis effects of interest in their own right. It is
therefore useful to introduce the following formal definitions:
Network Hysteresis: Temporary shocks in the form of idiosyncaratic worksite in
teractions result in persistently heterogenous network relationships for agents who
have identical observable worksite behaviors and structural attributes.
• Behavioral Hysteresis: Temporary shocks in theform ofidiosyncratic worksite inter
actions result in persistently heterogeneous worksite behaviors for agents who have
identical observable structural attributes.
As win be clarified more carefully in subsequent sections, one reason that network hysteresis
arises in the labor market framework is that job search is costly. Work suppliers bear the costs
of wasted time spent in submitting unsuccessful work offers to employers during the course of job
search. In the presence of capacity asymmetries, these sequentially incurred job search costs can
induce path-dependent networks among work suppliers and employers that support persistently
heterogeneous earnings levels across employed work suppliers and across nonvacant employers even
^All labor market experiments reported in this study are implemented using version 105b of the Trade Network
Game (TNG) source code developed by McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999), which in turn is supported by SimBioSys,
ageneral C-I-+ class framework for evolutionary simulations developed by McFadzean (1995). Source code for both
the TNG and SimBioSys can be downloaded as freeware at the current author's web site, along with extensive user
instructions.
when each matched work supplier iand employer pair expresses the same type of,worksite behavior
(e.g., mutual cooperation). Since this earnings heterogeneity arises from a structural ,asymmetry
(e.g., tight job capacity) and not from' any-'de'ficiency in the worksite strategies of the agents per
se", it cannot be remedied-by'evolutionary selection pressures acting upon these strategies;
' Behavioral hysteresis arises in the labor-market framework for two reasons: differences in, own
worksite strategies; and differences in the strategies' of worksite partners. The first reason-is easy
to understand. If two work'suppliers' have different-worksite strategies, then in,general they wiD
exhibit different worksite behaviors even if they are interacting with the same employer. • The
second reason is'more interesting and stems from" the following obser.vation:'The.behavior an agent
expresses in a worksite interaction is a function of the behavior that>is expressed by his worksite
partner. For example, a single work supplier interacting with two different employers can end up
in a mutually cooperative relation with' one employer" and'a completely, hostile; relation with the
other, all triggered by some difference in the employers' expressed behaviors (e.g., one employer
initially cooperates and the other initially defects). Thus, even if two work suppliers have identical
worksite strategies and are in ah identical network pattern with*employers (e.g., each is working
continuously for one employer), there is no guarantee they will express identical worksite behaviors
unless the employers they are interacting with have identical worksite strategies.
As will be clarified below, due to the relatively-greater mobility ofiwork suppliers and to evolu
tionary selection pressures, work suppliers'and employers tend to exhibit behavioral hysteresis in
their worksite interactions only in" conditions of excess job capacity. In conditions of balanced and
tight job capacity, the behaviors of the'agents within' each agent type.tend to coordinate rapidly
info similar or even identical* patterns'.) On the other hand, neither mobility nor evolutionary, se
lection pressures can eliminate'the substantial network hysteresis that tends to arise when there is
tight or excess job capacity.' • ' •
At a more global level,, network-and-behavioral hysteresis result in a one-to-many mapping
between treatment factors and-experimentaloutcomes. That is, for each-particular treatment, as the
initial random seed valueis varied across experimental runs,-a small but multiple number of distinct
network formations are observed to, arise and persist among work suppliers and employers across
runs, eacli supporting a distinct patternof worksite behaviors and earnings outcomes: This finding
is consistent with the many analytical two-sided labor market studies, such as Diamond (1982).
that establish the existence ofmultiple steady-state search equilibria. In the current process study,
however, a histogram is obtained for each treatment showing theproportion ofruns that evolve each
type ofnetwork formation, which provides suggestive information regarding the size and importance
of their basins of attraction.
' The labor market framework is described in Section 2. In Section 3. descriptive statistics are
constructed for-the ex post classification of network formations, worksite behaviors, and earnings
outcomes. The experimental design of the study is outlined in Section 4. and a detailed discussion
ofexperimental findings is presented in Section 5..^Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2. Labor Market Framework
The labor market framework differs in several-essential respects from standard labor market models.
First, it is a dynamic process model defined algorithmically in terms of the internal states and
behavioral rules of work suppliers and employers rather than by the usual system of demand,
supply, and equilibrium equations. The only equations that arise in the model are those used
by the agents themselves to summarize observed aspects of their world and to implement their
behavioral rules. Second, agents attempt to learn about the behavioral rules of other agents even
as these rules are coevolving over time. Third, starting from given initial conditions, all,events are
contingent on agent-initiated interactions and occur in a path-dependent time line. The analogy
to a culture growing in a petri dish, observed by an interested resarcher but not disturbed, is apt.
The labor market framework comprises an equal number M of work suppliers who make work
offers and employers who receive work offers, where M can be any positive integer. Each work
supplier can have work offers outstanding to no more than wq employers at any given time, and
each employer can accept wort offers from no more than eg work suppliers at-any given time, where,
the work offer quota wq and the employer acceptance quota eq czm be any positive integers.''
As seen in Table 1, work suppliers and employers are modelled as autonomous endogenously-
interacting agents with internalized social norms, internally stored state information, and internal
behavioral rules. Each agent, whether a work suppherbr an employer, has this same general internal
structure. However, work suppliers difter from employers in terms oftheir specific market protocols,
fixed attributes, and initial endowments; and all agents can acquire different state information and
evolve different worksite behavioral rules^ over time on tKe basis of their past experiences. Note,
in particular, that all agents have stored addresses for other agents together with internalized'
market protocols for communication.' These features'permit agents to cominunicate state-dependent
messages to other agents at event-triggered times, a feature not present in standard economic
models. As will clarified below, the work suppliers and employers depend on this communication
ability to seek out and secure workdte partners on an ongoing adaptive basis.
Insert Table 1 about here
As outBned in Table 2, activities in the labor market framework are divided into a sequence
of generations. Each work supplier ,and employer-in the initial generation is assigned a randomly
generated, rule governing his worksite b.ehavior together ,with initial^ expected utility assessments
regarding potential worksite partners. The work suppliers and employers then enter into a trade
cycle loop during which they repeatedly search for worksite partners on the basis of their current
expected utility assessments, engage in efficiency-wage worksite interactions modelled as prisoner's
dilemma games, and update their expected utility assessments to take into account newly incurred
job search costs and worksite payoffs. At the end of the trade cycle loop, the work suppliers and
employers each separately evolve (structurally modify) their worksitie behaviorial rules based on
^When wq exceeds 1, each work supplier can be interpreted as some type of information service provider (e.g.,
broker 'of consultant) that is able to supply services to at most wq employers at' a time or as some type of union
organization that is able to oversee work contracts with at most wq employers at a time.' - '
^In principle, agents could evolve any or iall of their behavioral rules, but for current study purposes only the
evolution of worksite behavioral rules is considered. ' " '
the past utility outcomes secured with these rules, and a new generation commences.
Insert Table 2 about here
The particular module specifications used in all experiments reported below will now be de
scribed in roughly the order depicted in Table 2.®
Matches between work suppliers and employers are determined using a one-sided offer auction,
a modified version of the "deferred acceptance mechanism" originally studied by Gale and Shap-
ley (1962)7 Under the terms ofthis auction, hereafter referred to as the deferred choice and refusal
(D.CR) mechanism, each work supplier submits work offers to a maximum ofwq employers he ranks
as most preferable on the basis of expected utility and who he judges to be tolerable in the sense
that their expected utility is not negative. Similarly, each employer selects up to eq ofhis received
work offers that he finds tolerable and most preferableon the basis of expected utility and he places
them on a waiting list; all other work offers are refused. Work suppliers redirect refused work offers
to tolerable preferred employers who have not yet refused them, if any such employers exist. Once
employers stop receiving new work offers, they accept all work offers currently on their waiting
lists.
A work supplier incurs a job search cost in the form of a negative refusal payoffR each and
every time that an employer refuses one of his work offers during a trade cycle; the ernployer who
does the refusing is not penalized.® A work supplier or employer who neither submits nor accepts
work offers during a trade cycle receives an inactivity payoff 0 for the entire trade cycle. The refusal
®A11 experiments reported in this paper are implemented using version 105b of the Trade Network Game (TNG)
source code developed by McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999). The latter study provides a detailed discussion of all
module implementations. In addition, the TNG source code (with extensive comment statements and user instruc
tions) can be downloaded as freeware from the current author's web site, permitting all module implementations to
be specifically viewed in source code form.
^See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a careful detailed discussion ofGale-Shapley deferred acceptance matching
mechanisms, including a discussion oftheway in which theAssociation ofAmerican Medical Colleges since WWII has
slowly evolved such an algorithm (the National Intern Matching Program) as a way ofmatching interns to hospitals
in the United States.
^This modelling for job search costs is equivalent to assuming: (i) each work supplier must pay a job search cost
in amount -R for each work offer he makes to an employer; and (ii) each possible worksite payoff for work suppliers
is increased by the amount -R, so that a work supplier is able to recoup the job search costs he incurs in making a
work offer if and only if this work offer is accepted.
and inactivity payoffs are eacli assumed to be measured in utility terms. ,
If an employer accepts a work offer from a work supplier in any-given trade cycle, the work
supplier and employer are said -to'be matched forithat trade cycle., Each match constitutes a
mutuaUy agreed'upon contract stating that the work supplier shall supply labor services at the
worksite of the employer until the beginning ofthe next trade cycle. ,These contracts are risky in
that outcomes are not assured: • "
Specifically, each matched work supplier and employer engage in a worksite interaction modelled
as a two-person prisoner's dilemma game reflecting the basic efficiency \yage hypothesis that work
effort levels are affected by overall'working conditions (e.g., wage levels, respectful treatment, safety
considerations). The work supplier can-either cooperate (exert, high work-effort) or defect (engage
in shirking). Similarly, the employer can either cooperate (provide good working conditions) or
defect (provide substandard working conditions). • .
The range ofpossible worksite payoffs is'assumed to be the's^e for.each worksite interaction, in
each trade cycle:" namely, as seen in Table 3, a cooperator whose, worksite partner defects receives
the lowest possible payoff L'(sucker, payoff); a.defector whose worksite partner also defects receives
the next" lowest payoff D (mutual defection payoff); a cooperator whose worksite partner-also
cooperates receives a higher payoff C (mutual cooperation payoff); and a defector whose worksite
partner.cooperates receives the'highest possible payoff H (temptation payoff). .
• I ,, , _ . ,
Insert Table 3 about here
•' •' '' '' kj r • y ' '
The worksite payoffs in Table 3 are assumed to be measured in utility terms, and to be normal-
. • ^ ;i -• ..-I,. • I ' . • ..;i
ized about the inactivity^ payoff 0 so that L<P<Q<C<H. Thus, a work supplier or employer
that ends up either as a sucker with payoff L or in a mutual defection relation with payoff D receives
negative utility, a worse outcome.than inactiyity (unemployment or vacancy). These worksite pay
offs are also assumed to satisfy the usual prisoner's dilemma regula,rity condition {L + H)/2 < C
guaranteeing that mutual'cooperation dominates alternating cooperation and defection on average.
Each agent, whether a work supplier or an employer, uses a simple learning algorithm to update
his expected utility assessments on the basis of new payoff information. Specifically, an agent v
assigns an exogenously given initial expected utility U° to each potenti^ worksite partner z with
whom he has not yet interacted. Each time an interaction with z takes place, v forms an updated
expected utility assessment for z by summing U° together with all payoffs received to date from
interactions with z (including both worksite payoffs and refusal payoffs) and then dividing this sum
by one plus the number of interactions with z.
The rule governing the worksite behavior of each agent, whether work supplier or employer,
is represented as a finite-memory pure strategy for playing a prisoner's dilemma game with an
arbitrary partner an indefinite number of times, hereafter referred to as a worksite strategy. At the
commencement of each trade cycle loop, agents have no information about the worksite strategies
of other agents; they can only learn about these strategies by engaging other agents in repeated
worksite interactions and observing the behavioral and utility outcomes that ensue. In consequence,
each agent's choice of an action in a current worksite interaction with another agent is determined
entirely on the basis of his own past interactions with this other agent plus his initial expected
utility assessment of the agent. Each agent thus keeps separate track of his interaction history with
each potential worksite partner.
At the end of each trade cycle loop, the utility (fitness) of each work supplier and employer is
measured by the average payoffhe attained over this trade cycle loop. Average payoffis calculated
as total net payoffs (negative refusal payoffs plus worksite payoffs) divided by the total number of
payoffs received. The worksite strategies of workers and employers are then separately evolved by
means of standardly specified genetic algorithms involving recombination, mutation, and elitism
operations that are biased in favor of more fit agents.® This evolution is meant to reflect the
®More precisely, for each agent type (work supplier or employer), the genetic algorithm evolves a new collection
of agent worksite strategies from the existing collection of agent worksite strategies by applying the following four
steps: (1) Evaluation, in which a fitness score is assigned to each strategy in the existing strategy collection; (2)
Recombination, in which offspring (new ideas) ate constructed by combining the genetic material (structural charac
teristics) of pairs of parent strategies chosen from among the most fit strategies in the existing strategy collection;
(3) Mutation, in which additional variations (new ideas) are constructed by mutating the structural characteristics
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formatibn and transmission'of newddeas-'by-miimcry and experiineiitatioii,,not reproduction in an\
biolo^cal sense. That is, ifaworksite strategy successfully results in high fitness for an agent .of a
particular type, then other agents of the same type are led to modify their own strategies to more
closely resemble the successful strategy.
An'important cautibii'is in order here,'however.- The information that work suppliers and
employers are currently permitted toi have access to in the evolution step is. substantial; namely,
complete knowledge of the collection of strategies used ^by agents.of their own type in the previous
trade cycle loop, ranked by fitness." The evolution'.step, is thus,more, appropriately interpreted as
an iterative stochastic' search algorithm'for determiningipossible strategy..cpnfiguratibn attractprs
rather than asa social learning mechanism perse. Theresulting outcomes will be used insubsequent
work as a yardstick-Against'which to assess the .performance :of more, realistic^y./modelled social
learning mechanisms. '• •' J • . i
3.. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS " : r
< I '1 .>v'Ij >• ,1-1 ij pI'v,'' . ' ' i
Each of the labor market experiments reported in this study results in a one-to-many mapping
• f r •••. ; f ,' ,, -j: ^ ' • • . : • •• • .•
between structural characteristics and outcomes. That is, when each particular experimental treat-
ment is repeated for a range of pseudo-random number seed values, a distribution of behavioral,
> 'M , •/' .1 • ' . -.••f , . • c ,
network, and utility outcomes is generated. Consequently, the mapping between treatment factors
and outcomes must be characterized statistically.
' ' " ' 'i . - ' r.Tl ..I >' I• ' - I .• V, . • >;r. I .
This section explains the descriptive statistics that have been constructed to aid jn the ex-
perimental determination of correlations between treatment factors and network formations, and
between network formations and the types of worksite behaviors and utility outcomes that these
'"'i !f. I- o.r ;; M,, , - . •[, ,, 5 , . . .
networks support. Networks depict who is working for whom, and with what regularity. Worksite
behavior refers to the specific actions undertaken by workers and-employers in their worksite inter-
; ; Ti -I .1 I J . I r
of each offspring strategy with some small probability; and (4)iReplacement, in which the most fit (elite) strategies
in the existing strategy collection'are retained for'the new collection of strategies and the least fit.strategies in the
existing strategy collection are ^replaced-with offspring'strategies.iSee McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999)-for a more
detailed discussion of this use of genetic dgbrithms in the Trade^Network Game (TNG), and see Sargent (1993) for
a more general discussion of genetic algorithm design and'use. ' ' •>!• ' • .i . • •
.ri
actions. FinaUy, utility refers to the average payoff levels attained by wort suppliers and employers
as a result of job search and worksite interactions.
3.A Classification of Contractual Networks by Distance
First introduced is a distancemeasure on persistent networks that permils the classiftcaiion
of these networks into alternative types. This distance measure calculates the extent to which an
observed pattern of persistent agent relationships deviates from an idealized pattern thai specifies
relationships among agent types without consideration for the identity of individual agents within
agent types. As wiD beseen in Section 5. thisdistance measure permits networks to bedistinguished
on the basis of the differential worksite behaviors and utility outcomes that they support. In
addition, as a by-product, it provides a useful indicator of the extent to which heterogeneity in
attained utility levels arises from network hysteresis.
All labor market experiments reported in this study were implemented using version 105b of
the TNG source code developed by McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999). Let s denote a seed value
for the pseudo-random number generator incorporated in this source code, and let E denote a
potential economy, i.e., an economy characterized structurally by the source code together with
specific values for all source code parameters^" apart from s. The sample economy generated from
E, given the seed value s, is denoted by (6. £).
Worksite strategies are represented as finite state machines,^ ^ hence the actions undertaken
by any agent v in repeated worksite interactions with another agent must eventually cycle.
Consequently, these actions can be summarized in the form of a worksite history H:P, where the
handshake ^ is a (possibly null) string of worksite actions that form a non-repeated pattern and the
persistent portion P is a (possibly null) string ofworksite actions that axe cyclically repeated. For
complete annotated listing of these source code parameters is given in Section 4 (Table 4), below.
Afintte state machine is a system comprising a finite collection ofinternal states together with a state transition
function that gives the next internal state the system will enter as a function of the current state andother current
inputs to the system. For the application at hand, the latter inputs are the actions selected by a worker and an
employer engaged in a worksite interaction. See McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999) for a more detailed discussion and
illustration of how finite state machines are used to represent worksite strategies in the TNG source code.
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example, letting cdenote cooperation and ddenote, defection,, the iworksite history dddidc indicates
that agent vdefected against agent 2in his first .three worksite, interactions with z and thereafter
alternated between defection, and cooperation. • • i
Awork supplier wand employer £• are-said to exhibit a persistent relationhip during a given
trade cycle loop Tof asample economy. (Si J5) ifthe following two conditions hold: (a) their worksite
histories with each other during the course of T take the-form .Hw'Pw ^d He'-Pe with nonnull
and Pei ^iid (b) accepted work offers between wandfC do not permanently ce^e during T either
by choice (a permanent switch to strictly preferred partners) or by refusal-(one agent becoming
intolerable to the other because of too many defections). A persistent relationship between w and
e is said to be latched if w works for e continuously (in each successive trade cycle), and it is said
to be recurrent if w works for e'randomly .or-periodically. -
Apossible pattern of relationships among the,work suppliers and employers in the final gen
eration ofa potential economy-jE is referred to as a network^ denoted generically by A(-E). Each
network A'(£)' is represented in the form lOf a directed graph in which ,the vertices V{E) of the
graph represent the work'suppliers and .employers,! the edges of the graph (directed arrows) rep
resent work offers directed from work suppliers to employers,r and the edge weight on any edge
denotes the number of accepted work offers between the work supplier, and employer connected by
theedge. ,
Let K{s,E) denote the ;network depicting the actual pattern of relatipnships among the work
suppliers-and employers.in the final, generation of the sample economy {SyE). The reduced form
network A'p(s,E) derived from K{s,E)-hy eliminating all edges of K(s,E) .that .correspond tp
nonpersistent relationships is referred,to as the'perswient neiuJorA: for..(s,£^). , . , ^
Let V°{E) denote a base network:pattern that partially or fully specifies a potential pattern of
relationships among.the work suppliers a^d employers in .the potential economy E by.placing general
constraints on the relationships'among agent types without regard for the individual identity of
agents within each type. For example, V°(E) could designate that each work supplier directs work
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offers to at least two employers. The collection of all networks whose edges conform to .the base
network pattern V°{E) is referred to as the base network class, denoted by K^{E).
The distance D''(s,E) between the persistent network K^{s,E) and the base network class
K°{E) for a sample economy (s.E) is then defined to be the number of vertices (work suppliers
and employers) for K^{s,E} whose edges (persistent relationships) fail to-conform to the base
network pattern ^{E). As will be demonstrated in Section 5, this distance measure provides a
useful way to classify the different types of persistent networks observed to arise for a given value
of as the seed value s is varied.
3.B Classification of Worksite Behaviors and Utility Outcomes
Let a sample economy (s,i?) be given. A work supplier or employer in the final generation of
{s,E} is referred to as an aggressive agent if he engages in at least one defection against another
agent that has not previously defected against him. The 1x2 vector giving the percentages of work
suppliers and employers in the final generation of (s^E) that are aggressive is referred to as the
aggressive profile for (5, E). The aggressive profile measures the extent to which work suppliers and
employers behave opportunistically in worksite interactions withpartners whoare either strangers^^
or who so far have been consistently cooperative.
A work supplier or employer in the final generation of (s, E) is referred to as persistently inactive
if he constitutes an isolated vertex of the persistent network K^{s,E). The 1x2 vector giving the
percentages of work suppliers and employers in the final generation of (5,£^) who are persistently
inactive is referred to as the p-inactive profile for (5, E). The p-inactive profile measures the extent
to which work suppliers and employers in this final generation fail to establish any persistent rela
tionships. The p-inactive percentage for work suppliers constitutes their persistent unemployment
rate, whereas the p-inactive percentage for employers constitutes their persistent vacancy rate.
^^The importance of stance toward strangers and first impressions for determining subsequent outcomes in path
dependent contextssuch as the labor market framework has beenstressed by Orbell and Dawes (1993) and by Rabin
and Schrag (1999).
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Awork supplier or employer in the final generation of (a. E) is referred to as a repeat defector if
he establishes at least one persistent relationship for which the persistent portion P of his worksite
history H:P includes a defection d. Defections for work suppUers correspond to shirking episodes,
and defections for employers correspond to the provision of poor working conditions. The 1x 2
vector giving the percentages of work suppUers and employers in the final generation of (s.f)
who are repeal defectors is referred to as the r-defector profile for (5.£). The r-defector profile
measures the extent to which work suppliers and employers in the final generation of(s.f) engage
in recurrent or continuous defections.
If. instead, a work supplier or employer in the final generation of {s,E) establishes at least
one persistent relationship and his worksite history for each of his persistent relationships has the
general form H:c, he is referred to as persistently met. The 1X2vector giving the percentages of
work suppliers and employers in the final generation of {s,E) who are persistently nice is referred
to as the p~Tiice profile for {s^E). The p-nice profile measures the extent to which work suppli
ers and employers in this final generation establish persistent relationships characterized by fully
cooperative behavior.
By construction, each work supplier and employer in the final generation of (s.£) must either
be a persistently inactive agent, a repeat defector, or a persistently nice agent.
Finally, the 1x2 vector giving the average utility (fitness) levels attained by work suppliers and
employers in the final generation of (a.E) is referred to as the utility profile for {s,E). The utility
profile measures the distribution of welfare across agent types.
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The labor market experiments reported in Section 5 are for two-sided markets comprising 12 work
suppliers and 12 employers. Each work supplier has the same offer quota, wq, and each employer
has the same acceptance quota, eq. Attention is focused on the effects of varying job capacity from
high to low. where job capacity is measured by the ratio eqjwq. Four different settings for job
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capacity are tested: high excess job capacity {eq >> balanced job capacity [eq = wq = 1):
tight job capacity {eq = 1 and wq = 2): and extremely tight job capacity {eg << wq).
The values for all remaining parameters are maintained at fixed values throughout all experi
ments. Table 4 lists these fixed parameter values along with the specific wq and eq quota values tor
an experiment with high excess job capacity. The parameter values in Table 4. togetlier with the
TNG source code, constitute a potential economy E in the sense defined in the previous section.
Insert Table 4 About Here
For each tested E. twenty sample economies {s.E) were generated using twenty arbitrarily
selected seed values s for the pseudo-random number generator included in the TNG source code.^^
For each run s. the persistent network A'^{s.E) was determined and graphically depicted, and the
components for the four behavioral profiles (a^ressive, p-inactive. r-defector. and p-nice) and the
utility profile were calculated and recorded.
A base network pattern ViE) was then specified for each tested economy E that constrained
the general relationships among agent types without relying on the individual identity of agents
within each agent type. This base network pattern provides the 0 point for the distance measure
D^{'.E) and hence is an intrinsically arbitrary normalization. However, its degree of specificity
governs the dispersion of the resulting distance values D^is.E) across sample runs .s and the extent
t,(i which these distance values display useful correlations with the components of the behavioral and
utility profiles. In practice, then, the choice of the base network pattern for each tested economy
was fine-tuned so that the resulting distance values provided a classification of networks into distinct
types supporting distinct patterns of worksite behaviors and utility outcomes.
Given ViE), the distance D°{s,E) of K^{s,E) from K°{E) was recorded for each run 5,
and a histogram for the distance values D°{s,e) was constructed giving the percentage of runs s
'^These twenty seed values are as follows: 5. 10. 15, 20. 25. 30. 45. 65. 63. 31. 11. 64, 41. 66, 13. 54, 641, 413, 425.
and 212. The final fourteen values were determined by random throws of two aind three die. The TNG source code
used to implement the labor market framework uses pseudo-random number values in the initialization of worksite
strategies, in the matching process to break ties among equally preferred worksite partners, and in genetic algorithm
recombination and mutation operations applied to worksite strategies in the evolution step.
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corresponding to eacli possible distance v^ue.'-'Finally, as a rough stability check, the number of
generations was also increased to. 100 for^each tested economy-£ and.the minimum, maximum, and
average values for. the,utility levels attuned-by-work suppliers and employers in each of the 100
generations were graphically generated for each sample .economy (s,£).• r
5. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
.1 . [ ' '-iVi ' "T-! ' • . I , • - ,1
Consider-a two-sided potential economy E comprising 12 work suppliers and 12 employers with a
work offer quota wq =,1 and aa employer acceptance quota, eq = 12. These quota values imply there
is high excess job capacity. Employers, are forced to, remain vacant unless work suppliers happen to
direct work, offers their way, hence employers face, a substantial .structure risk of vacancy. On the
other hand, work, suppliers.face.-zero str^uctuijal risk^of having their work offers refused by employers
because of limited job capacity. , ,
As depicted in Figure 1(a),,the,base,netwprk pattern V^iE) for this .high excess job economy
£•-15 as follows: Each work supplier is latched .to an employer, and each employer has at least one
latched,work supplier., •
" ' ' — Insert'Figure 1 !About Here —
Descriptive statistics for the; twenty sample economies (s^E) corresponding to this high excess
job economy E are presented in Table 5(a).Note that 75% of the sample economies {s,E) lie
in the distance cluster 3-9. The low mean utility level 0.35 attained by employers in this distance
cluster is due to three factors: a high mean p-inactivity (vacancy) rate among employers due to
high excess job capacity; a high mean aggression (initial defection) rate by work suppliers; and a
low mean p-nice (cooperation) rate by work suppliers that induces retaliatory defections by some
I I ''! ' I • • . i »• I ' * I , i t •
employers.
•' ' ' '' -i' "" I.'fi. " . /•' . 1 .'j
Table 5, for each distance cluster, the mean and standard deviation are calculated for each component of the
three behavioral profiles (aggressive,-p-inactive, andip-nice).and the utility profile across the sample runs lying in
this distance cluster. Since the r-defector profiles can be derived from the p-inactive and p-nice profiles (see Section
3.B), they are omitted. •-
PJ ;
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Insert Table 5 About Here
The persistent networks that arise for the sample economies (5. E) in distance cluster 3-9 reveal
strong network hysteresis, i.e.. strong persistent differences in relationship patterns for both work
suppliers and employers. The typical scenario is as follows: r-defector work suppliers latch on to
a proper subset of p-nice employers, with anywhere from one to four work suppliers latched to
the same employer, and drive down the utility levels of these employers to small positive values.
Remaining employers are left vacant with utility levels at zero (the inactivity payoff). This scenario
ensures that the worksite strategies of the p-nice employers are advantaged in the evolution step
relative to the worksite strategies of the employers who are left vacant. Since work suppliers and
employers evolve separately, the worksite strategies of the p-nice employers tend to reproduce into
the next generation, which ensures the perpetuation of a cooperative set of employers whom the
work suppliers can continue to opportunistically defect against.
At least some degree ofpersistent heterogeneity in utility levels across employed work suppliers
and across nonvacant employers is observed for each satmple economy ($,E) in the distance cluster
3-9. This persistent heterogeneity in utility levels across the active agents of each agent type is
primarily due to behavioral hysteresis - specifically, persistent differences in worksite behaviors
between different latched work supplier and employer pairs - rather than to network hysteresis.
The different distance values observed for the persistent networks arising in these sample economies
are essentially a count of the number of persistently vacant employers who have degenerated into
p-inactivity primarily by bad luck but also occasionally by ostracism.
Table 5(a) also shows that the remaining 25% of the sample economies for this E lie in a second
distance cluster D" = 24. The mean utility level 1.02 attained by employers in this second distance
cluster is much higher than that attained in distance cluster 3-9 due to the high mean percentage
of p-nice behavior exhibited by both work suppliers and employers. This mean utility level is
nevertheless substantially below the mutual cooperation payoff level 1.40 due to the 5% mean p-
inactivity (vacancy) rate among employers, a structural consequence of high excess job capacity
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that is independent of how cooperatively the employers behave in their worksite interactions. The
typical pattern exhibited in this distance cluster is p-nice work suppliers randomly directing work
offers among employers without latching. Note that the mean utility level 1.39 attained b> work
suppliers is very close to the mutual cooperation payoff level 1.40. No latching take^ place in an\
of the sample economies in this distance cluster, and utility levels are largely homogeneous across
employed work suppliers and across nonvacant employers.
Next consider the case in which the work offer quota remains at wq = 1 but the employer
acceptance quota is reduced to eg = 1so that job capacity is balanced. This change dramatically
affects network formation.
Specifically, bs depicted in Figure 1(b), the base network pattern now consists of disjoint latched
pairings of one work supplier and one employer. As detailed in Table 5(b). i5% of the sample
pronomies for this balanced job capacity economy E lie in distance cluster 0-2. implying that the
base network pattern is by far themost predominant network formation observed. Heterogeneity in
utility outcomes across employed work suppliers is essentially due to differences in job search costs
incurred in the process ofattaining thecoordinated base network pattern. Once in this coordinated
state, very little further heterogeneity in utility outcomes is observed either across employed work
suppliers or across nonvacant employers.
.More precisely, balanced job capacity favors employers over work suppliers, because work sup
pliers must bear the costs associated with job search. Nevertheless, the endogenous mobility of
work suppliers protects them from overly opportunistic worksite behavior by employers. An em
ployer who attempts to sustain too high a defection frequency against a work supplier will cause
this work supplier to quit (redirect his future work offers elsewhere) if other employers are perceived
as better earnings opportunities, or even to exit the labor force altogether. Although defections
by employers occur rather frequently in the handshake portions of worksite histories, in aU but
one of the sample economies the employers end up expressing largely p-nice behavior rather than
attempting to exploit the work suppliers' vulnerability to job search costs by engaging in repeat
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defections.
On the other hand, work suppliers who fail to latch when job capacity is balanced tend to accu
mulate large job search costs (negative refusal payoffs). Being fired by an employer for aggressive
or r-defection behavior can thus be very costly for work suppliers, and most display p-nice behavior
in their worksite interactions. Nevertheless, even work suppliers who succeed in established a mu-
tuaJly p-nice iatched relationship with a single employer typically accumulate twoor three negative
refusal pavoffs from a wide range of employers on their way to attaining this coordinated state.
These job search costs, together with the aggressive (initial defection) behavior of many employers,
tend to lower the mean utility level of work suppliers relative to employers.
The stability checks conducted for this balanced job capacity case reveal that many of the
sample economies exhibit unsettled mean utility outcomes over generations 1 through 100 in the
form of persistent drifting, bubbling,or regime shifts. The reason for this appears to be that, with
balanced job capacity, networks form in response to job search costs, yet they support largely p-nice
or even c.c worksite behavior. In consequence, these networks are not robust to the entrance of
new. initially cooperative worksite strategies introduced in the evolution step.
.•\s job capacity keeps tightening, work suppliers have an increasingly difficult time forming
persistent relationships with employers, a finding indicated in Figure 1 by the decreasing size of
work supplier boxes relative to employer boxes asone moves from part (a) to part (d). This increased
coordination failure is detailed in Table '), Note, in particular, the growing mean percentage of
work suppliers who become p-inactive (unemployed) as job capacity successively tightens.
More precisely, with tight job capacity, the typically observed experimental outcome is that each
employer forms persistent relationships with a particular subset ofwork suppliers. These persistent
relationships are recurrent in the following sense: In each trading period, the work offers received
by the employer from his persistent work suppliers exceed his job capacity limits, and he accepts
only a portion of these work offers by random selection. The reason for the random selection is
that these persistent work suppliers tend to be largely cooperative in their interactions with their
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employers, so that the employers'axe generally indifferent regarding whose work offers toaccepi.-
Since job openings-are relatively scarce, this implies that work suppliers face a risk,that their work
offers will be refused by employers due to* capacity limitations even .if they have never defected
against any'employer in their past worksite interactions. On the other hand. for. reasons.elaborated
above for the' case ofbalance'd job capacity, the endogenous^ mobility ofwork suppliers, still induces
largely p-nice behavior among employers. • - • • •• 'Ht \
A work supplier whose work offer '^is refused by'an employer incurs a job search cost. This
causes the work supplier to lower the utility he expects to attain from .any next work offer,to this
employer, which in turn encourages the work supplier to direct his next work offer elsewhere. A
work supplier who receives too many refusals from employers'eventually'ceases'making work offers
altogether because the expected utility he assigns to each prospective employer falls below zero,
the inactivity payoff level. This complete discpuragement tends to occur for work suppliers in the
early stages of a trade cycle loop when work suppliers are spreading their work offers among many
different employers and refusal rates tend to be high.
As discouraged work suppUers leave the labor force, however, refusal rates decline and the
condition of the remaining work suppliers improves. Consequently, even when job capacity is
extremely tight, over half the sample economies manage to evolve to a sustainable state in which
work supplierswho remain in the labor force are able to find employment at a high enoughfrequency
to sustain their utilitv levels at positive levels.
• I . I '< • • • - • , f I : ,
Heterogeneity in utility outcomes across employed work suppliers in conditions of tight and ex
tremely tight job capacity thus principally arises from two sources. First, work suppliers experience
differential numbers of accepted work offers, resulting in differential worksite payoffs. Second, work
suppliers experience differential numbers of refused work offers, resulting in differential job search
. I ' ' I ' ' ' I I "" . L I • L- .
costs.
."I' • i ' " • 1 " '
These differences in worksite payoffs and job search costs result from network hysteresis. Job
... > J. I .c' . ! . ; ' • • , '
search costs incurred by chance determine a network of persistent relationships among work sup-
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pliers and employers in a higWy path-dependent way. Some work suppliers manage to establish
recurrent persistent relationships with so many employers that they are essentially guaranteed to
achieve full employment in each trade cycle, whereas other "underemployed" work suppliers only
manage to place a few of their potential work offers in each trade cycle. This network hysteresis
supports persistent heterogeneity in utility outcomes across active work suppliers. Since this het
erogeneity is fundamentaliy caused by a structural asymmetry (too few job openings) and not from
differences in worksite strategies per se, it cannot be remedied by evolutionary selection pressures
acting upon woiksile strategies.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite the structural simplicity of the computational labor market framework used in this study,
the reported experimental findings highlight interesting network and behavioral hysteresis effects
arising froni idiosyncratic worksite interactions that may be important for understanding aspects
of real-world labor markets. For example, it is seen that these hysteresis effects tend to support
earnings outcomes that are more heterogeneous than would be predicted on the basis of the observ
able structural attributes of work suppliers and employers. This phenomenon is routinely observed
in real-world labor markets, and is referred to as the "excess heterogeneity problem" [Abowd et al.
(I999)j. The current study demonstrates the feasibility and potentiaJ usefulness of investigating
network and behavioral hysteresis effects in an agent-based computational framework.
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class,Agent .
{ ...
Intern^zed Social Norms: .
Majket protocols for communicating with other agents;
Market protocols for job search and matching;
Market protocols for worksite mteractions;
Internallv Stored State Information:
"•I' "
Mv attributes;
• * "• 1 ' i . . I t
. ,My.eiidowments;
My. beliefs and preferences;
, . ' Addresses I have for myself and for other agents;
Additional data I have about other agents.
Internal Behavioral Rules:
,My rules for gathering^and processing new information;
, . . My rules for determining my worksite behavior;
•, r. My rules for updating my beliefs and preferences;
. My, rules for ineasuring my utility (fitness) levd;'
iMv rules for modifying mv rules.
. ' •'
•u ,•
Table/IGeneral Form,of the Internal Structure of an Agent.
.O.-' • II ,
:i • -ie
mT: > '
int main () {
InitiateEcoiiomy():
For (G = 1 GMax) {
InitiateGen():
For (I = 1 IMax) {
MatchTraders():
Trade():
UpdateExpO;
AssessFitness():
EvolveGen();
}
Return 0;
// Construct initial subpopulations of
If work suppliers and employers with
// random worksite strategies.
// ENTER THE GENERATION CYCLE LOOP
// GENERATION CYCLE:
jf Configure work suppliers and employers
// with user-supplied parameter values
// (initial expected utility levels, work offer
// quotas, employer acceptance quotas....)
// Enter the Trade Cycle Loop
j j Trade Cyclc:
II Work suppliers and employers determine
11 their worksite partners, given
// their expected utility assessments.
// and record job search and
// inactivity costs.
// Work suppliers and employers engage
// in worksite interactions and
II record their worksite payoffs.
// Work suppliers and employers update their
// expected utility assessments, using
// newly recorded costs and worksite
// payoffs, and begin a new trade cycle.
// Environment Step:
II Work suppliers and employers
11 assess their utility levels.
// Evolution Step:
// Worksite strategies ofwork suppliers and
// employers are separately evolved, and
11 a new generation cycle begins.
Table 2: Logical Flow of the Labor Market Framework
•'( }
•/I-
Work Supplier
• - d
Employer
c ' ' d
•:y,(C,C) ^
' 1
. '(D-D) '•
s
Table 3: Payoff-Matrix for the Worksite Prisoner's.Dilemma Game
tr . )-, I . I ;
// PARAMETER VALUES
GMax = 50
IMax = 150
AgentCount — 24
RefusalPayoff = -0.5
InactivityPayoff = +0.0
. Sucker — -1.6
BothDefect = -0.6
BothCoop = +1.4
Temptation = +3.4
InitExpPayoff = +1.4
Elite — 67
MutationKate = .005
FsmStates = 16
FsmMemory — 1
WorkSuppliers = 12
Employers =12
// PARAMETER VALUES
WorkerQuota = 1
EmployerQiiota — 12
HELD FIXED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
// Total number of generations.
// Number of trade cycles per trade cycle loop.
/ / Total number of agents.
// Payoff R received by a refused agent.
// Payoff received by an inactive agent.
// Lowest possible worksite payoff, L. —
// Mutual defection worksite payoff, D.
// Mutual cooperation worksite payoff, C.
// Highest possible worksite payoff, H.
// Initial expected utility level, U".
JI GA elite percentage for each agent type.
// GA mutation rate (bit toggle probability).
// Number of-intemal FSM states.
// FSM memory (in bits) for past move recall.
// Nimiber of work suppliers.
// Number of employers.
VARIED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
// Work offer quota wq.
' ' // Employer acceptance quota eq.
Table 4: Parameter Values for a Labor Market with High Excess Job Capacity
(a) High Excess Job Capacity
(wq=l, eq=12)
(c) Tight Job Capacity'
(wq=2, eq=l)
^ '
w
(b) Balanced Job Capacity
"(wq=eq=l)
(d) Extremely Tight Job Capacity
(wq=12, eq=l)
• f
Figure 1: Base Network Patterns'for Labor .Markets with. Differential Job Capacities. A
relatively larger box for either work suppliers (W) or employers (E) under a particular job-capacity treatment
indicates that this agent type attains a relatively higher average utility, level in the sample economies whose
networks approximate the depicted base network'pattern. Straight' edges indicate latched (continuous)
persistent relationships and zig-zag edges indicate recurrent (random or periodic) persistent relationships.
• rn
D° Cluster % Runs AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE 1 P-NICE UTILITY
w e w e 1 w e w e
3-9 75% 97% 16% 2% 40% 3% 39% 1.74 0.35
(5%) (34%) (3%) (12%) (5%) (28%) (-27) (.14)
24 25% 2% 5% 2% 5% 98% 95% 1.39 1.02
(3%) (7%) (3%) (7%) (3%) (7%) (•02) (•03)
Table 5(a): High Excess Job Capacity (wq=l, eq=12)
D® Cluster % Runs AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY
w e w e w e w e
0-2 75% 16% 23% 1% 1% 94% 86% 1.10 1.33
(33%) (39%) (3%) (3%) (6%) (26%) .(.14) (•22)
4 10% 50% 54% 8% 8% 50% 46% 0.57 0.86
(50%) (46%) (8%) (8%) (50%) (46%) (.05) (.57)
24 15% 0% 22% 0% 8% 89% 78% 0.24 1.42
(0%) (20%) (0%) (0%) (16%) (20%) (•08) (.05)
Table 5(b): Balanced Job Capacity (wq=eq=l)
D° Cluster % Runs AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY
w e vv e w e w e
0-7 55% 2%
(3%)
5%
(9%) •
19%
(10%)
4%
(7%)
81%
(10%)
96%
(6%)
0.30
(.05)
1.35
(.09)
13-17 15% 100%
(0%)
69%
(43%)
47%
(14%)
19%
(18%)
8%
(12%)
14%
(20%)
0.32
(.04)
0.76
(.13)
24 30% 100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
-0.10
(0)
-0.02
(0)
Table 5(c): Tight Job Capacity (wq=2, eq=l)
D° Cluster % Runs AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY
w e w e w e w e
0-6 35% 1%
(3%)
1%
(3%)
12%
(4%)
1%
(3%)
86%
(7%)
96%
(6%)
0.31
(.03)
1.37
(.06)
15-17 20% 10%
(14%)
92%
(14%)
35%
(7%)
2%
(4%)
17%
(20%)
25%
(34%)
0.35
(.17)
1.22
(.20)
24 45% 100%
(0%)
100%
'(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
-0.10
(.00)
-0.01
(.00)
Table 5(d): Extremely Tight Job Capacity (wq=12, eq=l)
Table 5. Experimental Findings for Differential Job Capacities
